To find out the best means by which mankind could be governed, was the chief object of all Bentham’s exertions; and there is scarcely a work which he has written in which he has not some allusion to this subject. His expositions in reference to politics are divided into two distinct classes. In the one he lays down those principles and rules of action which ought to guide a people, supposed to have thrown off all trammels of prejudice and established custom, and to be in search of the very best form of government which a practical philosopher would dictate to persons ready implicitly to adopt his arrangements. In the other class of cases, in which he had immediate practical ends in view, his endeavour was to mould the existing machinery of established institutions and opinions to the production of the best practical results. The reader, therefore, must not take it for granted that the principles and institutions which are developed in the former class of works, are such as their Author would recommend a practical statesman, connected with an established government, to put into immediate operation, however much he might wish to establish in the statesman’s mind a leaning to such opinions as an ultimate end of gradual change. There are projects of practical reform in the minor works of Bentham, adapted to all grades of government, from democratic republicanism in the United States,* to Mahommedan despotism in Tripoli.† It will not be expected that any development should be here attempted of the different projects of reform which he thus applied to such distinct circumstances; but some explanation of the more conspicuous features of his opinions on government will be attempted.
He held that the ruling power should be in the hands of the people, because the happiness of the people being the object of government, the means of obtaining that object would thus be in the power of those who have the chief interest in realizing it. The happiness of every individual in the community would be best secured by giving every individual the species of government he would like best. But as confliction of interests renders this impossible, the nearest approach to such universal freedom of choice is, to put the power into the hands of the majority, whose use of it will not only be that which is most conducive to their own liking, but will likewise be such as cannot be very detrimental to a minority, which, in the case of such perfect freedom, must have too many interests in common with the majority to be in any case much injured by those proceedings which may appear to the latter the most fitting. But all the people of a state large enough to enjoy a separate government profitably, cannot collectively transact the business of government; and therefore it is necessary that some artificial arrangement should be adopted, by which the closest practicable approach may be made towards acting in accordance with their opinions: hence comes the Representative system.
Bentham was of opinion that no male adult should be excluded from voting for a representative, except those who are unable to read. His criterion of a right to the franchise was therefore equivalent to that which Mr Adam has aptly called The Knowledge qualification. Bentham termed it “virtually universal suffrage,” because it excluded no one who chose to take the trouble of learning to read; and it might fairly be estimated that those who refused to make this exertion were as unfit to exercise the right to advantage, as they were careless of its possession.‡ There were other persons besides “non-readers” who might be excluded, were it not for the complexity that would be so created —e.g. people of unsound intellect, and criminals. Their influence, however, would be almost imperceptible — they would not exist in any one place in sufficient numbers to be made serviceable tools of; and their votes, presuming them to be given without thought, or with a bad intention, would be likely to tell on either side of a contest with tolerably equal effect. Arrangements for excluding them would be complex and uncertain; whereas the criterion of ability to read is easily adjusted on a simple practicable arrangement, which is described in the Draft of a Reform Bill.* He was of opinion that the questions whether females should be admitted to the franchise, and how the political privileges they ought to hold should be bounded, could not be satisfactorily discussed while prejudices on the subject are so strong as they were when he wrote.†
Another of the essentials of representative government, is Secrecy in Suffrage — the system of the Ballot. The reasons will be briefly explained further on in connexion with the principle of responsibility. In the Draft of a Reform Bill, arrangements are made for conducting an election on the Ballot system, well worthy of the attention of practical reformers. The operation is to proceed on a raised platform in presence of the public and of certain officials, who all see that the elector votes for some one, without knowing for whom. In a glass-covered counter, cards are deposited bearing each the name of a candidate, a separate compartment being provided for the cards of each candidate. These cards have each a joint or hinge in the middle, admitting of their being folded double, with the name inside. At the moment of voting, no one sees these cards but the voter, who takes one of them up folded, and holding it between his finger and thumb in the presence of the public, hands it to an official, who, without seeing the name within, files it in the presence of the public.‡ It is a necessary preliminary of such a system, that all questions as to the right of voting are prejudged, and that no scrutiny can supervene.
Annual Parliaments, and equality of Election Districts, are farther arrangements of the representative system, the reasons for which are also noticed in connexion with responsibility. To obviate the inconvenience apt to be created by the annual separation of the legislature, a plan is devised for the appointment of a “Continuation committee,” to keep on through a succeeding session the thread of the legislation commenced in a preceding;§ an arrangement which, in conjunction with others for keeping projects of law once brought before the legislature from dropping out of notice, would prevent the public time from being unprofitably wasted, by being devoted, as that of the British Parliament frequently is, to the furtherance of measures which are afterwards lost sight of.
The arrangements for the strict attendance of the members of the legislature, and for economically adjusting the time at their disposal to their duties, form the subject of many stringent provisions in the Constitutional Code.* It is provided that the executive ministers of the state shall be present ex officio, in order that they may be questioned, may afford instruction and explanation, and may even originate measures and join in the debate — but they are not to have the privilege of voting.† That the superior experience and knowledge which the judges must possess, of the state of the law, and of the amendments from from time to time necessary to improve it, may be applied to practical use, an official communication with the legislature is kept constantly open to them; and to prevent their suggestions from being neglected, provision is made for these being incorporated in the body of the law, if the legislature, after the proper formal intimations, do not interpose a veto.‡
In the British Parliament much of the time that should be devoted to the general legislation of the country is wasted on local and private projects. Of these there are some that should be appropriated to the Courts of Law — others should be managed by Local Legislatures.§ The arrangements of such local legislatures, in subordination to the supreme body, are provided for in the Constitutional Code.∥
A hereditary legislative body is an institution utterly at variance with the first principles of that republican system, which Bentham considered to be the best form of Government in the abstract — the best form that could be adopted, if circumstances should give an unlimited variety of choice. But he was decidedly of opinion, that any second chamber, whether elective or hereditary, can operate to no good. It occasions delay. It makes rivalry and conflicts between house and house, which tend to the public detriment. It prevents decisions from coming clearly out, as between majority and minority, very often making a small minority of the collective members of the Legislature triumphant over a majority. The practical result of such a system, in the end, generally is, that the one house becomes the originating and working, and truly legislating body, while the other, finding itself incapable for good, has nothing to boast of but its capacity for mischief; the extent of which is the more palpably shown the more useful are the measures it resists. The services presumed to be performed by a second legislative body, in the shape of inquiry, and the deliberate and accurate inspection of measures before they are sanctioned, are all capable of being adapted to the legislation of a single chamber, through the instrumentality of committees.¶
In considering the proper arrangements for the conduct of business by a supreme legislature, it was found, that very little improvement could be made on the practice of Parliament; which, in Bentham’s opinion, made the nearest approach to abstract perfection, which has been exhibited by any human institution. To those who are accustomed to expect in his works nothing but censure of existing institutions, the chapter, “on the mode of proceeding in a Political Assembly in the formation of its decisions,” in the Essay on Political Tactics,* will be a remarkable exception. The chief elements of this excellence were found in the perfection of the machinery for preventing anything from going forth as a vote of the body, which had not been verbatim subjected to the inspection of its members; the arrangements, which rendered it impossible that a subject of debate could drop without being disposed of in some shape or other; the accurate line of distinction between debating and voting; and that scientifically arranged system for considering propositions in conjunction with their amendments, which admits of a vote being separately taken, upon every modification of a proposition which may happen to be before the house. He was of opinion, that the preservation of the liberties of the country was, in a great measure, owing to a firm adherence to the forms of Parliamentary tactics; and he attributed the contrast which they afforded, with the tedious, complex, and perverse forms of judicial practice in England, to the circumstance, that while the legislature had the distinct and rapid despatch of business honestly at heart, the proceedings in the Courts of Law were tortured and twisted to suit the sinister ends of the various parties — the suitors, the lawyers, the witnesses, and even the judges themselves. The work on Political Tactics was written with the design of doing a service to the National Assembly of France;† but, in that mobarena, its rational views, and the practical application of them, were alike unheeded.
This loose sketch of the leading principles of the system of government, developed by Bentham in his Constitutional Code and other works, would be incomplete without the statement, that, according to his plan, the head of the government is the Prime Minister, chosen by the Legislature.‡ Of the methods by which checks are kept upon the power of this official; of his relation to the heads of departments, and the machinery by which their duties and powers are limited and connected with each other, it would be impossible to give anything like a satisfactory view in this sketch; and reference must be made to the substance of the Code.
An important feature in all the political writings of Bentham, consists in elucidations of the means by which men intrusted with power may be prevented from abusing it to the public prejudice. Considering all the transactions of the Political authorities, including the administration of the law, as subject to two checks — the direction of superordinate political authorities, and the control of public opinion — he searched for the best means of enforcing these securities, and found it in the principle of individual responsibility. To this end, he desired that every judicial or administrative act should be so done, that it might be seen by whom it was done, and under what circumstances. With this view he preferred individual management to board management. Where there are several persons concerned in giving effect to an operation, responsibility rests with no individual, and cannot be accurately partitioned among all. The relief from responsibility releasing each individual from the anxiety to do right, renders the appropriate industry and skill unnecessary. If one head and one pair of hands can transact the business, it will not be better done if half-a-dozen heads and a dozen pair of hands of the same skill and ability join in it. If one person cannot do the whole, or if a man be found eminently skilful in respect to one part of the transaction, and unskilful as to others, let the operation be divided accordingly; keeping this in view, that whatever a man is expected to do, or does, it be known and seen whether he does it, and how. On the same principle, there are objections to the administration of justice by more than one judge at a time; and in this case there is the additional argument, that a difference of opinion known to exist among judges of equal rank, power, and means of information, unsettles the law, and encourages litigation.*
But the principle of individual action does not extend to the legislature. The object in this case is, not the transaction of the official business of the country, but the direction and the control of its transaction, for the benefit of the people by whom the legislature is constituted. It might be practicable to take the votes of the whole people for one ruler to be elected by the majority; but besides many other risks and inconveniences attending on it, such a system would leave totally unrepresented some class of political thinkers, which might be nearly as large as that by which the ruler was elected. The greater the number of representatives, the greater will be the number of persons represented, and the nearer will be the approach made to that point of abstract perfection, which would result in everybody being represented. At the amount, however, beyond which legislative business cannot be easily or advantageously transacted, the number of legislators must be limited; and thus the problem of representation cannot be worked out without a certain number remaining unrepresented. But though there is a necessitated community of action in a legislature, individuality of responsibility may be preserved — preserved in the proper quarter — between representatives and represented. It is held that the representative should, so long as he is in that position, be actually, so far as is practicable, the person which his designation announces him to be — the representative of the opinions of those who have chosen him. It is not possible that, on every question which may come before the legislature, his own opinion will be precisely that of the majority who voted for him. It is not, as a point of morality, recommended to him to adopt measures which his conscience repels, because his constituents approve of them. But it is his duty, if such a difference of opinion arise between him and his constituents, that, had it been anticipated before the election, he would not have been elected by them, to resign his seat. On the representative committing such an act of self-sacrifice, however, no dependence is placed; and a system of arrangements is expounded in the Constitutional Code, and the Election Code or Reform Bill, calculated to have the effect of removing, with the least practicable inconvenience and delay, any representative whose opinion is at variance with that of the majority of his constituents. The most important and comprehensive of these arrangements is the annual election of representatives; by which, not only is the period during which a representative can be acting at variance with his constituents reduced to a comparatively short one, but a periodical intercommunication has place between electors and elected, conducive to the interchange of information regarding each other’s sentiments.†
The principle of personal responsibility, carried through all other departments of the state, ceases with the constitutive or the elective constituency — the source of all political power. The interest of the individuals constituting the greatest number of the people is, that the government should be conducted favourably to the interests of that greatest number. Thus the general interest is each man’s personal interest. When any one is transacting that in which his personal interest alone is at stake, he need be responsible to no other person; and the interference of another will be more likely to lead him astray than to put him right. The elector, if uninfluenced, gaining nothing by his choice but his share in the results of good government to all, votes accordingly for the man who, as a legislator, will act to that end. But if his vote for a person who will not act, as a legislator, for the general good, be made more valuable to him than his chance of a share in the results of good government, he will, in the general case, vote in compliance with that stronger interest. Hence the operation of bribery and intimidation at elections. Secrecy of suffrage, or as it is commonly termed the ballot, is the remedy held out for this disease. As the candidate cannot know whether or not the service has been performed, it is held that he will not give the wages. It is held that, since there is no means of detecting the nonfulfilment of his bargain, the bribed elector is in the same position, as to interests, with the unbribed —i. e., his interest is identical with that of the public at large, and in favour of good government; and that the candidate, knowing this to be the case, will not throw away his money.*
But it is essential to the efficacy of this arrangement, as well as to the securing the majority in the legislature to the actual majority of the voters, that the electoral districts should be equal. Where one voter, by reason of his being in a small constituency, has as great a voice in the choice of a representative as ten have in a large constituency, then there is the temptation to bring against each elector in that small body ten times the amount of corruptive influence that will be brought against each constituent in the larger, or to single the former out for a concentrated attack. Thus, even were secrecy of suffrage conceded, without equalization of election districts, so great might be the corruptive power brought to bear against the small constituencies, that all practical barriers in favour of secrecy might be broken through.†
* See Works, vol. iv. p. 451 et seq.
† Ibid. vol. viii. p. 555 et seq.
‡ See Works, vol. iii. pp. 464, 470, 560, 565. —“Now as to the qualification by reading— At first blush, it seems to involve exclusion:— it does no such thing in effect. From two to three months’ social pastime, at the hours of repose from work, would give it to all adults in whose eyes the privilege were worth that price: and he, in whose eyes it were not worth that price, could not, with much justice, complain at the not having it. Qualification by householdership does involve exclusion: for it is not in every man’s power to pay rent and taxes for a house. Householdership is evidence of property; it is for this cause that it is required by those who stipulate for it. Qualification by payment of taxes —that too involves exclusion: if by payment of taxes be meant that which is anything to the purpose. Qualification by payment to indirect taxes, if those be the taxes meant, is universality of suffrage: for where is the human being that pays not to taxes on consumption? to the taxes called indirect taxes? Payment to direct taxes — to assessed taxes for example — is householdership under another name. Qualification by reading involves no exclusion: for every man who chose could give it to himself. He could do so, before a bill such as this could go through the forms, even supposing Honourable House ever so well disposed to it.”— P. 560.
* Works, vol. iii. p. 565.
† See Works, vol. ix. pp. 3, 108. Perhaps the following would be the just utilitarian method of treating this question. At the present moment there is, perhaps, not above one female in a hundred who wishes to possess the franchise. The extension of it to the sex would be a sacrifice of the peace and happiness of the ninety-nine to the ambition of the one, and even the agitation of the question would be a modified annoyance to the former. It will perhaps be time for seriously considering the question, when the majority of the sex show an inclination to have a voice in Parliamentary Politics.
‡ See Works, vol. iii. p. 571.
§ Works, vol. ix. p. 170.
* Works, vol. ix. p. 163-170.
† Ibid. p. 316.
‡ Ibid. pp. 431, 504-508.
§ “Of cases in which, for want of due discrimination between the duties peculiar to itself, and those not peculiar to itself, the Supreme Legislature stands exposed to the danger of wasteful application of its time, examples are the following:—
“Inquiry and decision as to a case in which property belonging to an individual is required to be transferred to Government, for some supposed preponderantly beneficial national purpose: and thence as to the quality and quantity of the compensation due. In this case the appropriate authority would be, not the Supreme Legislative, but the Judicial.
“Taxation, for the expense of works, the benefit of which is confined within the limits of particular portions of territory: say of peculiar districts. In this case a more apt authority would be, that of the sub-legislature of the district.
“So, if for any local purpose, common to some district.
“So, a transfer for a merely private purpose: the arrangement being clearly conducive to the mutual benefit of all parties; and the transfer capable of being made without detriment to the general sense of security and respect of property. Here the appropriate authority would be the judicial authority of the district.”— Works, vol. ix. p. 118.
∥ Works, vol. ix. p. 640 et seq.
¶ See Letter to Fellow Citizens of France on Houses of Peers and Senates. Works, vol. iv. p. 419. See also, ii. 307 et seq.; ix. 114 et seq.
* Vol. ii. p. 330 et seq.
† See Works, vol. ii. p. 299.
‡ Works, vol. ix. p. 208.
* See Works, vol. iii. p. 571 note; iv. 125; v. 17; vi. 557.
† See Works, vol. iii. pp. 512 et seq., 588, 600; ix. 191.
* See Works, vol. ii. p. 368; iii. 487, et seq., 547.
† See Works, vol. iii. p. 569; ix. 109.
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